Once operational, the new concept unveiled on 2 March will be a powerful signal of European cohesion, writes Étienne Marcuz.
Since their inception over sixty years ago, France’s strategic forces have trained to conduct nuclear operations with complete autonomy, ensuring that – whatever the circumstances – they could carry out a nuclear strike against any aggressor threatening France’s vital interests.
Unlike the other nuclear power in Europe – the United Kingdom, which assigns its nuclear weapons to the defence of NATO members, the French doctrine has been based on the principle that “la dissuasion nucléaire ne se partage pas”.
This autonomous capability is set to endure. But the speech delivered by Emmanuel Macron on 2 March at Île Longue marks a major shift, paving the way for certain allies to participate in France’s most sensitive and sovereign operations under a new concept called “forward deterrence.”
This new concept embodies the ‘European dimension’ of French deterrence, and respond to some extent to concerns about a deterrent gap in Europe raised in a European Nuclear Study Group report last month – given the doubts about reliability of U.S security guarantees.
According to Emmanuel Macron, forward deterrence “is a progressive approach. It offers, first of all, the possibility for partners to participate in deterrence exercises. It may also involve strategic signaling, including beyond our strict borders, or conventional participation of allies’ forces in our nuclear activities. It will finally involve the temporary deployment of elements of our strategic air forces to allied countries.”
This is by no means an admission of weakness, but rather a powerful signal of European cohesion sent to France and Europe’s competitors. Such arrangements already exist within NATO, with at least eleven European countries actively participating in the Alliance’s nuclear operations.
In his speech, the president named eight close allies with whom France has initiated a dialogue on nuclear deterrence: the UK, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, and Denmark.
Germany is seen as one of the key pieces in this new French doctrine. In a joint declaration issues the same day, Emmanuel Macron and Friedrich Merz announced the creation a high-level nuclear steering group, presented as a framework for “doctrinal dialogue” that France hopes will contribute to the development of a strategic culture that has been lacking in Germany. This new framework will eventually put Germany almost on a par with Franco-British nuclear cooperation, and might also help make up for the failure of the FCAS project.
The eight countries supporting the French initiative are among those most involved in NATO nuclear operations. Four of them, the United Kingdom Germany, the Netherland and Belgium already host US nuclear bombs, while Greek combat aircraft retain the capability to carry them if needed. The three others, Poland, Denmark and Sweden contribute to NATO’s CSNO (Conventional Support to Nuclear Operations) mission. The French proposal will complement NATO’s nuclear mission but differs on one significant point: only French fighter-bombers – the Rafale aircraft – will deploy French nuclear weapons. Allied contributions will focus on conventional support and the provision of infrastructure.
Deterrence exercises are the first step in the gradual approach outlined by the French president. French and NATO exercises are very different. NATO primarily relies on the U.S-made B61 gravity bomb, whereas French Rafales use supersonic ASMPA-R missiles that can be fired hundreds of kilometers from their target, requiring fewer escort and support aircraft. Both France and the allies first need to learn how to work together on this very demanding mission.
The next level of cooperation is strategic signaling. This type of activity aims to demonstrate France’s determination to protect its interests, fully factoring in the interests of its allies. The airborne nuclear component (CNA) is the tool of choice for these signaling operations. Its flexibility and visibility allows for “gesticulation” and offers escalation management options without resorting to kinetic operations.
With the “forward deterrence” concept, strategic signaling takes on a European dimension. From now on, any Rafale from the French Strategic Air Forces (FAS) deployed to the territory of one of France’s partners will have a nuclear dimension. This type of strategic messaging could be enhanced by fitting those Rafale with ASMPA-R mock-ups.
There could also be other forms of strategic signaling involving the oceanic nuclear component (CNO). In the future, it could be envisaged that French Triomphant-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) and their Invincible-class successors be deployed to foreign ports, with Faslane – the home port of British SSBNs – on the top of the list. In a major crisis, Faslane could also serve as a fallback base.
The first example of European-scale strategic signaling may have come from the recent the deployment of the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle to Malmö, Sweden. While the presence or absence of nuclear weapons on board is never confirmed, the timing of this deployment, coinciding with the 2 March speech – might not be coincidental.
The conventional participation of allies in French nuclear operations is the final step in the gradual approach presented by Emmanuel Macron. This could notably enhance the survival and penetration capabilities of French strategic forces. While they are capable of operating fully autonomously, their effectiveness could be further improved by allies providing capabilities that are currently absent in French inventories, such as anti-radiation missiles and stealth aircraft (F-35A/B).
Allies could also contribute to reinforcing capabilities present in the French inventory, but sometimes in limited numbers, such as aerial refueling or conventional escort. Allied Gripen and Eurofighter aircraft, for example, could relieve the fleet of Rafales and Mirage 2000D from conventional squadrons, allowing nuclear-capable Rafales to focus on nuclear weapon delivery.
In addition to reinforcing cohesion among the participating countries, forward deterrence will therefore also strengthen the resilience and effectiveness of French strategic forces. In the more distant future, further steps towards deeper cooperation could be added, such as a Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA) capability similar to NATO’s.
Étienne Marcuz is a Senior Analyst on strategic armaments and an Associate Fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS). He worked at the French Ministry of the Armed Forces between 2016 and 2022.